

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP**

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Remarks


Executive Secretary
17 June 1986

Date

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STAT

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William Casey Esq
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Langley
Virginia

5th June 1986

Dear Bill,

I thought you might find the enclosed of interest.

I hope to see you in London, perhaps in July.

With kindest regards,

Yours ever

A stylized handwritten signature in dark ink.

David Hart



C-119-1R

THE TIMES TUESDAY JUNE 3 1986

Salt: why Reagan is right

by David Hart

President Reagan's announcement that, in future, he will consider US and Nato security needs rather than the constraints of the Salt II treaty when determining the size and composition of American strategic forces has been greeted by a depressing chorus of complaint from his allies. Canada said it was "profoundly disturbed" and West Germany that it would be a "potential disaster" for arms control. In Britain the Foreign Office issued a statement which, when decoded by the press, was reported to be in uncharacteristically strong terms.

The Americans allege that Moscow has failed to comply with the Salt II treaty and the anti-ballistic missile treaty in several important ways, including the introduction of two new intercontinental ballistic missiles, the SS 24 and SS 25, instead of the one permitted; the encoding of missile test information to make it harder for the Americans to monitor Soviet compliance; and the construction of a phased array radar at Krasnoyarsk in Siberia.

Last summer, President Reagan offered to "go the extra mile" and remain with the Salt II constraints provided the Soviet Union ceased these violations. It has not.

The allies do not seriously dispute these allegations (although the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence are sticking to their indulgent view that the radar at Krasnoyarsk may not be a

violation), and they have had 12 months clear warning of Reagan's intentions. Despite this, they complain that abandonment of Salt II could undermine the East-West dialogue, making negotiations at Geneva less likely to succeed, and that it could hand the Soviet leaders a propaganda advantage with Western public opinion by underscoring what they see as Reagan's lack of genuine interest in arms control.

The first of these objections bears no relation to the observed facts. Only a few years ago, the American (and European) refusal to halt deployment of cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe persuaded the Soviet Union that it had no choice other than to return to negotiate at Geneva. Why should a similar show of determination over Soviet violations of existing arms control treaties have exactly the opposite effect? The history of arms negotiations demonstrates that Moscow responds only to Nato strength and determination. It will not negotiate seriously if it thinks it can employ propaganda to get a cut in Western arms without giving up any of its own. But institutional memory in the West is dangerously short.

The attitude of many European political leaders to President Reagan himself is exemplified by Neil Kinnock's remark in India last

week in which he alluded to the "impression made by Ronald Reagan in cowboy films." Many European political leaders, even if they remain publicly silent, have a similar attitude.

But Reagan's announcement, far from demonstrating a lack of commitment, shows — particularly to the Soviet Union — that he is committed to the *substance* of arms control rather than to its *superficies*. All the existing arms control treaties were agreed after lengthy and difficult negotiations. Each side was obliged to make compromises and accept clauses not entirely to its satisfaction. That both should adhere to the clauses that they find less satisfactory as well as to those they find more satisfactory is the essence of any agreement intended to be taken seriously.

President Reagan plainly feels that he must signal to the Soviet Union that both sides have to abide by all clauses in arms control treaties if there is to be genuine international security. If the US simply permits the Soviet Union to violate the clauses it finds inconvenient it is sending to Moscow a signal similar to that the Foreign Office sent to Argentina before the invasion of the Falklands. It could eventually have similar consequences.

Western Europe has a greater population and a larger combined

gross national product than the US but spends much less per capita on defence. It has, instead, increasingly relied on America to guarantee its security. This may explain why so many European political leaders suffer from the kind of shame-faced cynicism that is common among recipients of welfare.

Most ordinary Americans have little knowledge of, or interest in, Europe. The allies should ask themselves how much longer American leaders will be prepared or able, given this natural tendency to isolationism, to subsidize European defence if every time they make a decision that they believe is necessary for Western security it is greeted with knee-jerk unconstructive criticism. A significant number of congressmen want substantial cuts in defence spending, and a smaller number want to leave Nato. Allied complaints only give ammunition to both these groups.

It is clear that some allied governments, including the British, hope to persuade President Reagan to reverse his decision and stay within the Salt II limits. But to abandon this decision would be to undercut the six years in which Reagan has brought the US from gloomy toleration of Soviet bullying under President Carter to the self-confident, outward-looking optimism that will be one of the most important components of the Reagan legacy.

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